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The price of crude oil goes up and up _ most recently driven by hurricane
Katrina, which had a catastrophic effect on the US oil industry, and was fol-
lowed by hurricane Rita. In September 2005 the price of Brent crude reached
a new record at US $ 66 per barrel. The agreement by member states of the
International Energy Agency (IEA) to release crude oil and petroleum prod-
ucts from their strategic reserves has brought prices down again slightly,
but it is very questionable whether this will calm the upward drive for long.
Crude oil prices have been rising continuously since 2003, largely as a
result of increased demand, particularly from China. The high level of
capacity utilization in oil extraction creates risks that are reflected in rising
prices on the forward markets. The rise in oil prices since 2003 is around
US $ 30 per barrel, and this is probably mainly due to short-term effects and
resultant speculative buying.
In view of the high stocks of oil the current prices do seem excessive.
Sooner or later they will normalize on a lower level, but in the long term
higher prices for oil than the average of recent decades must be expected.
Model simulations up to the year 2025 show that in a scenario of adequate
resources real oil prices (price base 2000) of between US $ 30 and US $ 40
per barrel are to be expected. In a scenario of more limited resources, how-
ever, prices could rise to just under US $ 80 per barrel in real terms, which is
up to US $ 160 nominally. 
Oil prices on record level
In the last four years the price of Brent crude has roughly tripled (cf.
figure 1). In nominal terms it is much higher than in the previous record
year, 1981. In real terms, that is, taking into account the fall in the value of
money due to the general rise in prices, the price of oil has come back very
close to that year's level of around US $ 70 per barrel (cf. figure 2). This has
also affected other energy prices, especially gas prices (see box).1
The current surge in prices for crude oil has been caused by increased
demand and production shortfalls, against the background of oil extraction
1  See also Jochen Diekmann, Manfred Horn, Claudia Kemfert and Uwe Kunert: 'Upward Move-
ment in Energy Prices'. In: DIW Berlin Economic Bulletin, vol. 41, no. 12, December 2004.
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capacities working at full stretch world wide; specula-
tion on the forward markets has fuelled the upward
movement.
Demand for oil has grown markedly all over the
world in recent years, with an increase of 3.5% in 2004
alone. China's consumption of crude oil has risen partic-
Figure 2
Price of Brent Crude Oil1 per Barrel, 1970 to 20042
1 Until 1979 Saudi Arabian Light. — 2 Estimated for 2004.
Sources: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, diverse issues; Deutsche Bundesbank; US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Consumer Price Index, Washington D.C.,
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Figure 1
Brent Crude Oil Price Trends, March 2000 to September 2005
Note: The grey bar is the official OPEC price corridor that still applies.
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ularly strongly. However, after an increase of 14% in
2004 the growth rate this year is expected to be lower
(cf. table 1).2 The IEA assumes that demand in China
will rise by 5% in 2005 and by 7% in 2006 (cf. table 2).
As in 2004, more oil was produced than consumed in
the first half of 2005; the second quarter actually showed
a surplus of 2.7 million barrels a day (mbd). So crude oil
stocks in the OECD countries have risen and they are
now back above the average of the last five years. For
the period from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2004
a negative correlation can be shown between the level of
crude oil stocks in the OECD and oil prices. According
to this, with the present level of stocks in the OECD
(977 million t in July 2005) crude oil prices should be at
most US $ 20 to US $ 30 per barrel; in fact they are two
to three times higher.
As a result of hurricane Katrina and the flooding in
the southern states large parts of US oil production in
the Gulf of Mexico have ceased to operate. Ninety per-
cent of the US oil extraction capacities have been dam-
aged, causing a loss of output of 1.4 mbd. A month's
loss is about 2.1% of US annual production. At least
part of the big increases in oil prices which resulted is to
be reversed by releasing 60 million barrels of the IEA
countries' oil reserves (corresponding to 2 mbd for
30 days). Germany has joined the initiative and released
3.6 million barrels. Should more hurricanes hit the
United States the IEA would consider releasing more oil
reserves.
The speculation on the oil forward markets is ulti-
mately due to the present high capacity utilization in
OPEC. If the grounds for this speculation are to be
removed and the price of crude oil brought down for the
long term, the OPEC countries must convince the inter-
national public that they will greatly increase their pro-
duction capacities in the next few years and soon bring
their reserve capacities back to a more reassuring level.
The OPEC countries stated at their meeting on 20 Sep-
tember in Vienna that they will increase their produc-
tion capacities by 5.5 mbd, to 38 mbd by 2010.
It could also help to calm the market if the general
public could be more convinced that the state-controlled
oil stocks of the OECD countries are sufficient to meet
any serious disruption to supply. Any information pol-
icy to improve market transparency would also need
international agreement (the G8).
However, as long as the increases in production have
not materialized price risks will persist. Moreover, the 2  IEA: Oil Market Report, Paris, 11 August 2005.
Coupling gas prices to oil prices no longer appropriate
For more than three decades the price of gas has been con-
tractually fixed to the oil price. This is firstly to ensure that the
heavy investment in the infrastructure needed to supply gas
(pipelines) can be financed, and secondly to ensure that gas
remains competitive on the heating market. In addition, the
gas suppliers were initially hoping to avoid strong fluctuations
in the price of gas by tying it to the price of oil.
Certainly, heavy investment is still needed in the gas infra-
structure, as the latest decision to lay a gas pipeline from Rus-
sia to Germany shows, but that in itself does not justify tying
the gas price to the oil price. The reasons for increases in the
oil price do not directly affect conditions on the gas market,
and it is now difficult to explain why the gas price should follow
the strong fluctuations in the oil price, as is inevitable when the
two are tied.
Where oil and natural gas are competing on individual mar-
kets – and that is mainly the case on the heating market – oil
and gas prices will be linked, even under competitive condi-
tions. But they will be linked through substitution competition,
and not because they are contractually tied, which limits com-
petition between oil and gas. In view of the big market share of
gas contractual coupling with the oil price is no longer appro-
priate.
Liberalizing the electricity and gas markets in Europe is
intended to intensify competition in these areas. Admittedly,
the gas market, unlike the electricity market, has very few sup-
pliers, but in the long term the number could rise noticeably if
more liquidized gas (LNG) is consumed, as it can be trans-
ported over long distances at relatively low cost.1
By opening the European gas market the European Commis-
sion has helped to ensure that prices on the gas market can in
future move freely in response to market forces.2 In Germany
competition can initially also be intensified by shortening the
periods covered by contracts between natural gas suppliers
and distributors (local authority utilities enterprises).
But even without contractual coupling of the gas price to the
oil price, and with more intensive competition – as in Britain –
there can be considerable price fluctuations. A strong
increase in demand and the clear domination of the world's
biggest supplier of gas, Russia, could cause a marked rise in
prices. Even if more intensive competition does not in every
case guarantee falling prices it is desirable for big suppliers as
well (including Russia) to comply with the rules of the market
and so also increase substitution competition with oil.
1  Cf. Christian von Hirschhausen, Claudia Kemfert and Franziska Holz:
'Russian Energy and Climate Policy Remains Inconsistent – Chal-
lenges for the EU', in: DIW Berlin Weekly Report, no. 11/2005.
2  The European Commission insists on this in its latest status report,
cf. 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council – Annual Realisation of the Single Electricity and Gas
Market', Com (2004) 863, Brussels, 5 January 2004.
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reduction in the OECD oil stocks can be interpreted by
speculators as a further shortage, and this could drive
prices up even further.
Long-term factors 
affecting the oil market
Contrary to what is often maintained, there is not, at
present, any shortage of crude oil. Extraction of conven-
tional oil (not including heavy oils, oil sand and oil slate)
will reach its peak world wide in 15 years at the earliest;
then it will start to decline (cf. figure 3).
But that need not necessarily involve rising oil
prices. The Energy Information Administration (EIA)
and the IEA are optimistic that oil will be available at
relatively favorable prices in the next quarter century,
namely at between US $ 30 to US $ 35 per barrel,3
although if energy policy remains unchanged demand
for oil and natural gas will rise strongly by 2030 _
Table 1
World Oil Consumption and Extraction and Changes in Stocks from 2002 to 2005 according to 
the IEA1
In million barrels a day (mbd)
2002 2003
2004 2005
I II III IV Year I II III IV Year
 
Oil consumption
OECD 48.0 48.6 50.1 48.2 49.1 50.44 9 . 55 0 . 64 8 . 64 9 . 65 1 . 14 9 . 9
 North America 24.1 24.5 25.2 25.1 25.4 25.7 25.4 25.5 25.2 25.8 26.1 25.7
 Europe2 15.3 15.4 15.6 15.2 15.6 16.0 15 . 61 5 . 51 5 . 31 5 . 61 6 . 01 5 . 6
 Pacific 8.6 8.7 9.3 7.9 8.2 8.8 8.5 9.5 8.1 8.2 9.0 8.7
Others 29.7 30.6 32.0 32.8 32.6 33.33 2 . 73 3 . 33 3 . 23 3 . 73 4 . 83 3 . 8
 Former Soviet Union 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.1 3.8
 E u r o p e 0 . 70 . 70 . 80 . 70 . 70 . 70 . 70 . 80 . 70 . 70 . 70 . 7
 China 5.0 5.6 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.6 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.8 7.2 6.7
 R e s t  o f  A s i a 8 . 08 . 08 . 48 . 78 . 38 . 78 . 58 . 78 . 88 . 69 . 08 . 8
 Latin America 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0
 M i d d l e  E a s t 5 . 25 . 35 . 55 . 55 . 85 . 65 . 65 . 85 . 76 . 15 . 95 . 9
 A f r i c a 2 . 72 . 72 . 82 . 82 . 72 . 82 . 82 . 92 . 92 . 82 . 92 . 9
World 77.7 79.2 82.1 80.9 81.7 83.88 2 . 18 3 . 98 1 . 88 3 . 38 5 . 98 3 . 7
Oil extraction3
OECD 21.9 21.6 21.8 21.5 20.8 21.02 1 . 32 0 . 92 1 . 02 0 . 62 1 . 32 0 . 9
 North America 14.5 14.6 14.8 14.7 14.5 14.4 14.6 14.4 14.6 14.5 14.9 14.6
 Europe2 6 . 66 . 36 . 46 . 25 . 76 . 06 . 15 . 95 . 85 . 55 . 85 . 7
 Pacific 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Others without OPEC 24.5 25.6 26.5 26.8 27.3 27.5 27.02 7 . 52 7 . 72 8 . 22 8 . 62 8 . 0
 Former Soviet Union 9.4 10.3 10.9 11.11 1 . 41 1 . 51 1 . 21 1 . 41 1 . 51 1 . 71 1 . 81 1 . 6
 E u r o p e 0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 2
 China 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
 R e s t  o f  A s i a 2 . 52 . 62 . 72 . 72 . 82 . 82 . 82 . 72 . 62 . 72 . 82 . 7
 Latin America 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3
 M i d d l e  E a s t 2 . 12 . 02 . 01 . 91 . 91 . 91 . 91 . 81 . 81 . 81 . 81 . 8
 A f r i c a 3 . 03 . 03 . 33 . 33 . 53 . 53 . 43 . 63 . 63 . 84 . 03 . 7
OPEC 28.8 30.7 32.2 32.3 33.4 33.9 33.0 33.5 34.0 . . .
 Crude oil 25.1 26.8 27.9 28.1 29.1 29.5 28.6 28.8 29.3 . . .
 Natural gas liquids (NGLs) 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8
World 76.9 79.7 82.3 82.5 83.3 84.2 83.1 83.7 84.5 . . .
Oil extraction minus oil consumption –0.8 0.5 0.2 1.6 1.6 0.4 1.0 –0.2 2.7 . . .
Change in stocks4
OECD –0.3 0.3 –0.4 0.9 0.5 –0.2 0.2 0.1 1.4 . . .
Deviations in sums due to rounding.
1 IEA = International Energy Agency. — 2 Including Turkey. — 3 Including condensates, natural gas liquids, unconventional oils, net volumetric gains in the refinery process
and liquid energy sources based on alcohol or hard coal. — 4 Net, without miscellaneous balancing items.
Quelle: International Energy Agency: Oil Market Report. Paris, 11. August 2005.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 33/2005  367
according to the IEA by 70%. To meet the growing
demand the IEA estimates that investment of up to
US $ 100 billion a year will be needed.
Two thirds of the oil fields that are known today and
still unopened are in the Middle East, mainly Saudi Ara-
bia, Iran and Iraq. The Middle East countries' reserves
are seven times higher than those of the western OECD
states, but they are investing very much less in extrac-
tion. Exploration in Europe and North America is much
more expensive than in the Middle East. In addition, the
Canadian oil sands contain more oil than all the cur-
rently known reserves. Open cast mining of these depos-
its was already commercially viable even before the rise
in oil prices from 2003. However, extracting oil from oil
sand is very energy-intensive, especially if the deposits
3  Some researchers, however, assume that maximum output has
already been reached and that this is the explanation for the surge in
prices. Cf. Colin J. Campbell: 'Oil Crisis', Multi-Science Publishing Co.,
Ltd., Oxford, 1st edition 1995, new ed. 2005.
Table 2
World Oil Consumption and Extraction 2005 and Prognosis for 20061
In million barrels a day (mbd)
2005
2006
I II III IV Year
Oil consumption
OECD 50.0 51.0 48.9 50.1 51.5 50.4
North America 25.7 25.9 25.6 26.2 26.4 26.0
Europe2 15.6 15.6 15.3 15.7 16.0 15.6
Pacific 8.7 9.5 8.1 8.3 9.1 8.7
Others 33.8 34.6 34.7 35.1 36.1 35.1
Former Soviet Union 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.8 4.1 3.8
Europe 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
China 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.3
Rest of Asia 8.8 9.0 9.2 8.9 9.3 9.1
Latin America 5.0 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.1
Middle East 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.2 6.2
Africa 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0
World 83.7 85.6 83.7 85.2 87.6 85.5
Oil extraction3
OECD 20.9 21.3 20.8 20.6 20.9 20.9
North America 14.6 14.9 14.8 14.7 14.8 14.8
Europe2 5.7 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.5 5.5
Pacific 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Others without OPEC 28.0 28.8 29.0 29.3 29.7 29.2
Former Soviet Union 11.6 11.9 11.9 12.2 12.4 12.1
Europe 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
China 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Rest of Asia 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Latin America 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.5
Middle East 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
Africa 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3
Demand for OPEC oil 34.8 35.5 33.9 35.3 37.0 35.4
Crude oil4 30.0 30.4 28.8 30.1 31.7 30.2
Natural gas liquids (NGLs) 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.2
World 83.7 85.6 83.7 85.2 87.6 85.5
Deviations in sums due to rounding.
1 IEA data base. — 2 Including Turkey. — 3 Including condensates, natural gas liquids, unconventional oils, net volumetric gains in the refinery process and liquid energy
sources based on alcohol or hard coal. — 4 Difference between world demand for oil on the one side and OPEC production of NGLs and oil extraction by the other regions on
the other side.
Sources: IEA: Oil Market Report, Paris, 11 August 2005; DIW Berlin calculations.
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the other side.
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are very deep.4 Oil products can also be made from natu-
ral gas, coal and biomass, and oil consumption can be
reduced, for example through technical improvements.
In view of these factors the price level for crude oil
should be clearly below the present level in the long
term.
How will oil prices move
in the medium to long term?
It is difficult to estimate how oil prices will move in the
next few years, owing to the considerable uncertainty
caused by the current scarcity of oil extraction capaci-
ties and the resultant speculations on the forward mar-
kets for oil.
The latest increase of 2 mbd in OPEC output quotas
has not produced any noticeable relaxation on the oil
market. If oil extraction capacities were to be markedly
increased, and the increase in demand prove to be more
moderate than in the last two years, it would be quite
conceivable for the market price of oil to fall to a
medium-term trend of US $ 30 to US $ 35 per barrel in
real terms. But if demand continues to rise at the present
strong rate crude oil prices could remain on the present
high level for some time, as in that case building up the
reserve capacities needed to calm the market would take
longer. More unusual events like political unrest, or nat-
ural disasters like the recent hurricanes, could drive the
price up even further, at least temporarily.
With their strong market position the OPEC coun-
tries will continue to exert a strong influence on the
development in oil prices. Their scope for price move-
ments will largely depend on how big the oil resources
really are and whether production can be increased
enough _ as the IEA, for example assumes _ or whether
more pessimistic estimates that worldwide oil extraction
has already passed its peak, or will do so in the next few
years, prove correct.
To mark out the range of possible developments
model calculations were carried out in which it was
assumed that OPEC will orient their production to the
objective of maximizing their export earnings over the
long term. The model calculations indicate that crude oil
prices will be between US $ 30 and US $ 40 per barrel in
real terms by 2025 (in year 2000 prices) if resources are
adequate, but if their availability is restricted real oil
prices could reach just under US $ 80 per barrel (that
would be up to US $ 160 per barrel nominally, cf.
table 3).
Should the OPEC countries try to keep prices on the
present high level, even if resources are adequate, while
production outside OPEC increases, as the IEA and the
US Energy Information Administration expect, in a few
years OPEC would be facing a dilemma, because
demand for OPEC oil would fall to a level that would not
be acceptable to Saudi Arabia.
Conclusion
Once the oil production plant in the United States starts
operating again and if OPEC, as announced, does
increase its output again in the next few months, oil
prices could fall back noticeably. If there are more natu-
ral disasters that prevent production or political crises
4  Oil sand is a mixture of clay, sand, water and bitumen. Bitumen can
be converted to synthetic crude oil. The oil sand is extracted from
deeper layers by feeding steam into the seams to liquidize the bitumen.
The disadvantages of this process are the huge consumption of water,
the energy needed to create the steam, the problem of waste water dis-
posal and possible environmental damage below ground.
Figure 3
The Trend of Crude Oil Extraction in Different 
Scenarios
In million barrels a day (mbd)
1 The Hubbert function is a logistic function from which a bell-shaped course of oil
extraction can be deduced. The peak of production is passed when half the total
resources are consumed (cf. Oil & Gas Journal, 17 April 2000). — 2 Without heavy
oil. — 3 Without heavy oil and other unconventional oils (e.g. oil sand).
Sources: Energy Information Administration (EIA); International Energy Outlook
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in major oil producing countries, then considerable
surges in prices are possible, and releasing reserves
would only partly reverse these. 
At present oil prices do seem to be unjustifiably
high. Sooner or later they will return to a more normal
level. But a return to the average level of the last two
decades is not to be expected in the long term. Model
simulations up to the year 2025 show that in a scenario
of adequate resources real oil prices of between US $ 30
and US $ 40 per barrel (price base 2000) are to be
expected. In a scenario where only limited resources are
available, however, prices could rise to just under
US $ 80 per barrel in real terms, which would be up to a
nominal price of US $ 160 per barrel.
Table 3
Crude Oil Prices as Forecast by the EIA1 and Scenarios by DIW Berlin
In US dollars (real, 2000 price base) per barrel
2000
2010 2025 2010 2025
Scenario A2 Scenario B3
EIA 2005 27.6 31.0 35.0 35.0 48.0
Model calculations by DIW Berlin
Reference4 27.6 34.4 38.3 69.2 77.2
Greater price elasticity of supply of non-OPEC oil5 27.6 25.4 28.4 61.7 68.8
Greater price elasticity of demand for oil products6 27.6 28.2 31.5 47.0 52.4
Internalisation of costs for environmental protection in the OECD7 27.6 30.5 34.0 66.7 74.4
1 Energy Information Administration. — 2 Variant without resource restrictions. — 3 Variant with resource restrictions. — 4 Price elasticity of demand for oil products = –0.5;
price elasticity of supply of non-OPEC oil = 0.1. — 5 Price elasticity of supply of non-OPEC oil = 0.3. — 6 Price elasticity of demand for oil products = 0.7. — 7 US $ 30 per
barrel.
Sources: EIA; International Energy Outlook 2005, Washington D.C., 2005; Manfred Horn: 'Zur Preispolitik der OPEC in langfristiger Perspektive', in: Zeitschrift für Ener-
giewirtschaft, vol. 4, 2004, pp. 285-292.